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Political institutionalization has become a common concern and catchword,
especially as regards the institutionalization of democracy in the post-communist
countries and the design of an overarching cooperative order in Europe. However,
institutionalization still is far from representing a well-defined analytical concept or
an elaborated political strategy. An important question to be answered is: What are
the preconditions for a successful strategy of conflict management, based on
institutionalization? Cases in point are an envisaged all-European order under the
umbrella of the OSCE, sub-regional cooperation (the Visegrád group) and
ethnopolitics in the Baltic states. The concept of political institutionalization as
defined in the paper draws from Samuel Huntington's classic definition in his book
"Political Order in Changing Societies": Institutionalization is the process by which
formal institutions and democratic procedures "acquire value and stability".
Neoinstitutionalist criteria such as responsive problem treatment, benign elites and
common repertoires of action are used to amend and operate the political strategies
of conflict management contained in this core concept. Theoretical and empirical
analysis shows that whether institutional design and transfer of values and norms
result in an ameliorative transformation of conflict depends not so much on
establishing effective problem-solving mechanisms and arenas for bargaining but on
taking into account path-dependencies of the conflict process in point. Moreover, it is
essential that institutionalization does not block the conflict process but opens new
opportunities to continue it within a regulating framework.
This paper draws from my habilitation thesis, to be published with the title Politische
Institutionalisierung und Konflikttransformation. Leitideen, Theoriemodelle und
europäische Praxisfälle (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, Fall 2000). My research was
funded by the German Research Council (# Si 672/1-1, 1-2, 1-3).
PD Dr. Alexander Siedschlag, Affiliate Professor, Humboldt University Berlin,
Department of Social Sciences, Unter den Linden 6, D-10099 Berlin, Germany. Email alexander.siedschlag@rz.hu-berlin.de

1. Conflicting views of institutionalization and conflict management
To a large extent, conflict management and conflict prevention in the 'new' Europe
(defined by dissolution of the bloc structures, increased intra-regional interdependence
and efforts to create an all-regional institutional order) have become associated with
precluding nationalist revival and settling ethnic conflict (cf. Bugajski 1995;
Chayes/Chayes 1996; Seidelmann 1996). This paper however consciously abstains
from equating conflict with violence and limiting its scope to ethno-nationalist strife.
Instead, it investigates in political conflict in Europe. It would be a fallacy to assume
that the institutional framework of European politics itself is uncontroversial and far
from experiencing or even causing conflict. Nowadays, there is obviously no lack of
interests in and ideas of a common policy of conflict management and conflict
prevention. Nevertheless, those interests and ideas need to be politically assembled,
and one must not forget that precisely this is an onerous task which itself carries much
seed of conflict.
In various treatments of practical questions of political integration and conflict
management in contemporary Europe, the concept of institutionalization is a constant
point of reference, albeit it has never been elaborated on continuously. Examples are
the concern for an overarching "democratic governance" (March/Olsen 1995) and new
strategies of democratic consolidation and institutional design (Elster/Offe/Preuss
1998; Heper/Kazancigil/Rockman 1997). In the discipline of international politics,
during the first decade after the Cold War the content and extent of international
institutions (conceived of as formal cooperative arrangements between rationalegoistic nation states) was regarded the principal strategy in order to realize a
stabilizing conflict transformation (that is, a reduction of the variety of conflict
potentials and a decrease of conflicts over values) as well as to develop an appropriate
frame of reference for the analysis of conflict potentials in contemporary West-East
relations (cf. Keohane 1993; Keohane/Martin 1995).
All of this points to some important questions of political conflict management
through the institutional channel. Yet it has not been sufficiently explored how this
concept of conflict regulation functions and how it can be applied to cases in point.
Rather, one-sided perspectives now as before dominate in the discussions. Institutions
and institutionalization often are regarded as an immanent way to general political
improvement, amenable to rational design, whereas lower degrees of
institutionalization, for example missing visible nodal points of conflict regulation,
rashly are associated with institutional decay or a loss of political steering capacity

(cf. Goodin 1996; Lijphart/Waisman 1996; Schneider/Weitsman 1997). Appropriate
institutions alone, the scholars arguing for this view assert, can dominate all potentials
of political conflict in Europe: Common market institutions accelerate and deepen the
turn away from planned economy and automatically bring the newly independent
states closer to the European Union and the liberal-democratic systems of its member
states; democratic institutions strengthen young political systems and forestall
autocratic relapse; social institutions guarantee mentality change; international
institutions, finally, unmistakably foster all-regional integration.
Behind these assumptions lie a couple of unarticulated and unclarified political ideas
as well as logic gaps: The invoked 'institutions' seem to face no time and spacespecific conditions for their existence and effectiveness, and it is only natural that they
consequently deepen and/or expand once obstacles disappear. The more the
institutions grow and become rooted, the more conflicts vanish. Institutions are seen
as equivalent to progress and political effectiveness, they embody models of a 'good'
political order easy to recognize and imitate. What these grand institutional tales lack
are concepts to answer questions of institutional change and of interplay between
institutions and conflict: For example, how does institutional change affect conflict
processes and how do conflict processes foster or hamper institutional change?
However, it must be acknowledged that the neoinstitutionalist debates have come to
cover questions of concrete problem-solving programs and conflict management.
Conflict has of course been a governing subject for neoinstitutionalism from its
inception, though rather in theory. Take, for example, research in international politics
on the driving factors and different explanatory modes for cooperation between nation
states, seen as rational egoists (Baldwin 1993; Kegley 1995; Ruggie 1993), the
positive theory of institutions and its models of conflict regulation through structureinduced equilibria (Shepsle 1989; Shepsle/Bonchek 1997), policy research with its
interest in the path-dependencies - how current political procedures and decisions of
conflict management are influenced by past - (Steinmo/Thelen/Longstreth 1992), or
the school of institutional design with its formal typologies of efficient arrangements
for political exchange. In contrast to all of this, discussing neoinstitutionalism as a
specific strategy of conflict is a comparatively new trend (see for example Galtung
1996; Lederach 1997; Scharpf 1997).
In contrast to this new trend, the broad field of the theory of institutions still has little
of substance to offer when it comes to answering the question of how
neoinstitutionalism can contribute to practical knowledge about conflict management
and what elements of a political strategy it entails. One considerable branch of the
theory of institutions focuses on designing institutions for optimal collective decisionmaking. It aims at preventing conflicts right from their inception, for it considers all
conflict politically dangerous and a threat to political stability (cf.

Hechter/Opp/Wippler 1990; Shepsle/Weingast 1995). For that school, where
institutions reign, conflict disappears, and only if conflict has disappeared does
genuine politics begin. Another school emphasizes all politics to be an essentially
conflict-laden enterprise, as are decisions about establishing or reforming common
institutions (Czada/Windhoff-Héritier 1991; Elster/Offe/Preuss 1998;
Ostrom/Feeny/Picht 1993).
Not only have these two strains of thought not found together so far, but they are also
in conflict with recent developments in conflict theory. In their course, institutions
have come to be conceived of as institutionalizations, that is, as a result and
condensation of concrete interaction processes, not as mere structural frames or
political locations designed to shape interaction. At the same time, these institutions in
the sense of institutionalizations are classified not as conflict regulating but as
conflict exacerbating. They are seen as decrepitudes, as deflections form rational
problem solving and as effectors of protracted conflict. In this perspective, institutions
do not guarantee order and effective problem solving, they rather guarantee the
continuity and enlargement of conflict (cf. Arrow et al. 1995; Bauwens/Reychler
1994; Burton/Dukes 1990; Kolodziej/Kanet 1996; Sandole/van der Merwe 1993;
Vasquez et al. 1995).
If for neoinstitutionalism conflict remains politically unsuitable and
institutionalization not so much seeks to regulate as to eliminate it, for conflict theory
precisely the institutionalization of conflict appears unsuitable and to be avoided,
because it is associated with an automated reproduction of frictions and with a lockedin inefficient problem treatment. Thus, it is all the more necessary to elucidate the
preconditions, strategies and intended as well as unintended consequences of
cooperative conflict management in terms of institutionalization.

2. Institutionalization as a strategy of conflict transformation
The starting point for this undertaking is a distinctive concept of institutionalization:
Institutionalization as a way of ameliorative conflict transformation - that is, not
conflict regulation and problem solving related to single cases but a path to improved
general capacity to cope with conflict. This capacity includes a common
understanding of conflict, common ideas of conflict regulation along with practical
procedures and trained willingness to compromise. John R. Commons (1934: 73 and
682) was the fist to speak of such an institutional idea of conflict regulation, as
opposed to a rationalist idea of conflict regulation. This institutional idea of conflict
regulation is not about receipts of problem-solving and attuning individual preferences
and calculations of gain. In contrast, it is about regulating transactions, in the course

of which not only 'goods' but also ideas and practices are exchanged. These ideas and
practices develop and change during the process of transaction itself (Common's
example was Anglo-Saxon common law).
Institutionalization, however, by no means necessitates an ameliorative transformation
of conflict. According to Buckley (1967: 161), we need to distinguish
between ameliorative and degenerative (or pejorative) institutionalization. Something
not only is institutionalized when it causes value-commitment and consensus. Many
problems are precisely so difficult to tackle because they are institutionalized just as
much, albeit programmed with disruptive values and ideas. Therefore it is necessary
to investigate the conditions for success, the windows of applicability and the risks of
political institutionalization as a paradigm for conflict management. The first step to
do so is to clarify the underlying definition of the term "conflict".
Conflict is defined here as reciprocally conscious, incompatible action tendencies or
orientations between identifiable actors, manifesting themselves in the interaction
processes between those actors (cf. Glasl 1999: 14-15; Kriesberg 1998a: 2). One
often-neglected distinction forms an important additional conceptual basis for the task
at hand. We need to appreciate the difference between conflict potentials and manifest
conflict processes (MCPs), as well as between conditions for activating conflict
potentials into MCPs and opportunities for the escalation and de-escalation of MCPs
(Kriesberg 1998a: 23-25; Rummel 1991: 92-93; Sandole 1993).
What follows from these definitions and from the lessons learned from the differences
between the schools of thought outlined above is that not the conflict itself and its
episodic manifestations should be institutionalized but the pattern and process of
conflict regulation. Following Kriesberg (1998a: 7 and 110-111), conflict regulation is
institutionalized when and as far as conflict potentials develop and manifest conflict
processes happen in well-defined political arenas with a dense network of norms and
rules. This is the case when the actors have internalized common rules of the
enactment of their conflict and when at the same time these rules are externalized, that
is, withdrawn from the actors' immediate access and expressed, for example, in
tradition or wording of the law as well as stipulated by a system of sanctions and
selective incentives.
Some relevant general foundations of institutionalization as a strategy of conflict
management have been elaborated in the field of labor economy, on the basis of
considerations over the system of dispute settlement between union and management
(cf. Külp/Schneider 1972). Building up on this, institutionalization can be said to rest
on three pillars, forming the PET principle:

1. General procedures such as strike, lockout, arbitration and other well-defined
measures in the course of a labor dispute.
2. Reliable expectations based on clear types of actors and specific reciprocity.
3. A systematic de-personalization, attributing cleavages and conflicting interests
to types of actors (e.g. the parties of a wage agreement), not to individuals or
small groups.
This triad corresponds to the new consensus in policy analysis, according to which
institutionalization has three components: typified action settings, typified action
strategies and typified actors (cf. Scharpf 1997: 43-49). This again can be chained up
to Huntington's classic definition of political institutionalization from Political Order
in Changing Societies (1968: 12): "Institutionalization is the process by which
organizations and procedures acquire value and stability." Huntington's definition
implies a focus on institutions not so much as formal arrangements of the system of
government but as democratic action patterns: "Institutions are stable, valued,
recurring patterns of behavior" (ibid.).
The characteristic of institutionalization as a strategy of conflict management and of
institutionalized conflict management itself is that it does not so much rest on formal
settings and conflict resolution as it does on apt action strategies and paths for
regulated articulation of conflict. Therefore, institutionalization is not self-enforcing
but dependent on 'qualified' and inclined actors who enact and reproduce it.
Institutionalization thus requires not only constraints on individual and collective
choices but also an allocation of property rights so to enable the actors to act
according to the institutional logic (cf. March/Olsen 1995: 28 and their concept of the
"logic of appropriateness" as well as Elster/Offe/Preuss 1998: 27-34 and their concept
of the "institutionalization of agency").
In addition, institutionalization as a strategy of conflict management is to a large
part reflective institutionalization (March/Olsen 1995: 42, 44-47 and 245-248, see also
ch. 3 of this paper): Its efficacy depends on how the actors frame their conflict and
how they interpret and actively use the available rules and strategies in one case and
another. It is an often-neglected fact that any institutionalization always requires some
external reinforcement mechanisms, which are also of reflective, or soft, type. A
useful catalog of those enforcing factors has been compiled by Axelrod (1986: 11031108). An example of such a mechanism is the "social proof": Positive signals coming
from cooperation already practised by elite actors or established in other fields of
conflict.
What these concepts lack nevertheless and what makes it difficult to translate them
into policy proposals is that they say nothing about effectors: What are the
mechanisms that bring about conflict transformations and what is the underlying

causality? To answer this question, we have to look at the broader field of social
science institutionalism. The neoinstitutionalist school of organizational theory for
example assumes that the effector of ameliorative conflict transformation is the
incorporation of conflict and its processes into well-defined arenas, copying
potentially disruptive interaction processes into established contexts and paths of
problem treatment (cf. Scott 1995: 117-118). This does not guarantee effective
problem solving, but it seems to guarantee the effective localization of conflict in a
setting from which it is unlikely to enlarge or escalate dramatically: Transferring
conflict interaction from the field of grassroots politics and everyday social relations
to a governmental arena secures responsive problem treatment. It is essential, though,
that there are well-defined paths for re-embedding, that is, for transporting
compromises and solutions back into the immediate process of politics.
An example of this procedure is the translation of societal conflicts into the structures
and standard operating procedures of the governmental system. That way for instance,
ethno-political conflict can be transformed into a matter of electoral legislation and
municipal suffrage for minorities. In this institutional property space, it becomes
better foreseeable what political interests minority groups will develop, what
strategies they will adopt, to whom they will turn for support and to whom they will
come out against. The problem however is that such an approach can easily result in
an over-institutionalization of ethnic politics, establishing far too strong frames of
interpretation and norms of reciprocity.
In Latvia for example, we can observe political decisions being framed in ethnonational categories even where they have no direct impact on ethnic or minority
issues. The Latvian government as well as the Russian-speaking minority backed by
the Russian government are quick to play the "ethnic card", as they did in March 1998
in the capital of Riga on the occasion of an unannounced demonstration by 1.000
Russian pensioners, who were protesting against tax increases (see Goble 1998). The
demonstrators were dispersed by the police charging with batons, and what followed
was a severe crisis in Latvian-Russian relations. The Russian foreign ministry accused
Latvia of flouting human rights, and Russian parliament, the Duma, took the
opportunity to call on President Jeltsin to act with determination and consider
economic sanctions in order to enforce a change in Latvian minority policy. This case
is symptomatic for it shows how apt even politically insignificant episodes are at
disturbing the precarious balance in the Russian-Latvian conflict scheme. The case
shows as well how easily institutionalized conflict may be utilized by all parties as a
political lever arm so to promote their respective self-interests or summon up
legitimacy in face of their electorate.
Thus it is a fallacy to assume that political institutionalization, in this case the
institutionalization of ethnicity, directly promotes ameliorative conflict transformation

in the sense that it necessarily encloses ethnic conflict, translating it into regularized
procedures of political and societal cleavage management. Rather, as Gurr (1993: 6)
has pointed out, the institutionalization of ethnicity is always precarious in that it may
provide the actors with opportunities to gain social capital for holding disputes which
they need for their political purposes.

3. Rationalist vs. reflective institutionalization
The fundamental problem with deriving practical strategies for conflict management
from the concept of institution as well as from neoinstitutionalist thought in general is
that the meaning of the basic terms differs from one approach to the other. There are
two big schools of thought (e.g. Grafstein 1992; Peters 1999; Soltan/Uslaner/Haufler
1998): rationalist institutionalism, a methodological individualist train of reasoning
favoring rational choice as basic concept and reflective institutionalism, a
methodological collectivist train of reasoning relying on the methods of sociology and
social history.
For rationalist institutionalism (exemplified by Dodd/Jillson 1994; Ostrom 1990;
Shepsle/Bonchek 1997), institutions are rules for efficient collective decision-making
and programs for guided change. They regulate conflicts which not yet have found
their place in the political arena. The basic mechanism is to influence the actors'
preferences and strategic choices through a system of selective incentives
(Richter/Furubotn 1997). On these grounds, the conflict process is expected to
institutionalize itself and find its own rules without any further external reinforcement.
This heavily draws from the concept of structure-induced equilibrium, at the same
time creating constraints on and new resources for the actors' behavior
(Shepsle/Weingast 1981). The practical strategy of conflict management according to
rationalist institutionalism is institutional design (cf. Goodin 1996;
Hechter/Opp/Wippler 1990): Constructing functional property spaces, enclosing
conflict processes into them, allocating property rights and selective incentives,
centralizing scattered norms and affecting the actors' payoffs, thus trying to alter
preferences. In order to be functional, however, institutional property spaces need to
have "institutional fit", that is, they must be compatible with the social reality to
which they are applied and not add odds with other institutional mechanisms already
in operation there. Immediate relevance of the regulating mechanism hence is more
important than perfect instrumentality (Young/Underdal 1997: 16-21).
In practice, rational institutionalist conflict management consists in elite procedures,
roundtables, structured dialogues and the like. The basic approach is to hand manifest
conflict processes over to special political arenas where elites replay the conflict on a

representational basis. For such a strategy to be successful, it is indispensable that the
structure of the conflict in question (mainly the involved types of actors and the
debated issues) does not change over time.
For reflective institutionalism (exemplified by Brinton/Nee 1998; Grendstad/Selle
1995; Powell/DiMaggio 1991), institutions are lock-ins and path-dependencies,
stemming from 'historical' conflicts and their solutions tied to that particular time but
having outlived the issues, coalitions of interest and political strategies that once
brought them about (this is best elaborated in the historical-sociological approach, see
e.g. Rueschemeyer/Skocpol 1996). In a rational institutionalist's view, they have
become mere barriers for responsive, gradual policy change (cf. Arrow et al. 1995).
Reflective institutionalists, however, argue that these institutions bear an efficient
secret, for they are right from their inception embedded in the social and political
processes they are meant to regulate. Reflective institutionalization as a strategy of
conflict management attempts to thicken the cognitive, the normative and the 'moral'
context of conflict interaction in order to create reciprocal perceptions of elementary
common grounds, to defuse conflict potentials and to prevent conflict potentials from
turning in manifest conflict processes (cf. Grendstad/Selle 1995; March/Olsen 1995;
Offe 1996).
Reflective institutionalism is skeptical of the efficacy of selective incentives and
institutional design, for it sees conflict processes highly path-dependent and not
located in a specific arena that would make it amenable to strategies of functional
regulation. Rather, in its view, conflict typically comprises different strains of
controversial issues, the relations between them being fuzzy and involving "policy
crowding" (Linder/Peters 1990: 65): New problems interfere with old solutions and
vice versa, and different solutions impede each other. It is worth to notice that, while
American neorealism in international politics (as established by Waltz 1979) is now
usually taken to be close to the logic of rationalist institutionalism (for rationalist
institutionalism in international affairs, see for example Baldwin 1993;
Haftendorn/Keohane/Wallander 1999), European neorealism, especially the systemicstructuralist approach set forth by Buzan/Jones/Little (1993) and the synopticintegrative approach of the Munich School (Kindermann 1986, 1996; Meier-Walser
1994; Siedschlag 1997, 1998) have some important contributions to make to elaborate
on the 'reflectivist' concept of institutions and conflict transformation.
Especially promising here is the method of constellation analysis as developed by the
Munich School of neorealism. Constellation analysis takes into account that conflict
processes, their escalation as well as their settlement, depend on perceptions - or on
misperceptions - and that conflict processes themselves are a natural ingredient of all
social interaction, of which politics is an integral part, not a distinct sphere. Moreover,
constellation analysis assumes politics and conflict processes to be no chains of

readjusted calculations of advantage and phenomena of rational choice but to be joint
acts, comprising interaction on different levels of aggregation, in overlapping
institutions and in intersecting action systems. Therefore, empirical hermeneutics (the
analyses of socio-cultural patterns of self-understanding and interpretation, resulting
strategies typical of specific actors' conflict behavior as well as of the dynamic
processes of communication and perception) form an integral part of any conflict
analysis. This broad scope makes it necessary to employ a wide range of analytical
concepts and methods from the wider field of social sciences. Consequently, this
version of neorealism has much in common with the methods of reflectiveinstitutionalist analysis and its strategy of conflict transformation.
Drawing for example from organizational theory (Czarniawska/Sevón 1996;
Scott/Meyer et al. 1994), historical institutionalism (Steinmo/Thelen/Longstreth 1992)
and cultural theory (Grendstad/Selle 1995; Thompson/Ellis/Wildawski 1990), the
concept of reflective institutionalization aims at a 'deep' transformation of conflict,
ameliorating the underlying culture of conflict with its frames and scripts, not just
altering preferences and strategies (Kriesberg 1998a; Lederach 1997). Ideally, this
results in proactive, or preemptive, conflict management: The emergence of a
common property space that prevents deep frictions and conflicts of interest from
developing. Conflict management, then, becomes a process of endogenous
transformation. Its maxim is not to import new values but to activate already existing
but hidden positive values. Lederach (1995) argues in respect of ethnic conflict that
independent of whether it provides new opportunities, property rights or expectations
of relative gain, increasing the conflicting parties' general level of capability of acting
(for example officially acknowledging them as a legitimate interest group) defuses
critical tensions. This new capability of acting imparts new self-assurance, creates a
positive shadow of the future and thus reduces the incentives for manifest conflict
behavior, which again gives way to the development of long-term, less explosive
expectations and strategies. A problem is that for this model to function, the evolving
culture of accommodation must remain localized, that is, stay within the underlying
frame of issues.
An instructive political example here is the European Union's (EU) preparation for
enlargement and its pre-accession strategy designed to acquaint the candidate
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with the obligations and procedures
under the treaty of Amsterdam (on EU enlargement, see Mayhew 1998). In this
context, reflective institutionalization is an often neglected challenge for the EU. The
Union preparing for enlargement not only needs to ensure that the candidates comply
with the regulations for the common market and have economies strong enough to
withstand the pressure of the Union's economic dynamics. The EU must also
anticipatorily socialize its prospective members into the soft network of values,

norms, rules and procedures that govern its politics in the areas of intergovernmental
cooperation (as opposed to supranational integration), such as primarily the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), now striving to become a genuine European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (see Zielonka 1998). In addition, relevant fields
of intergovernmental cooperation in the EU also include, for example, cultural policy.
In the course of enlargement and for the cohesion and effectiveness of an enlarged
EU, there are several important dimensions of reflective institutionalization, which are
likely to regulate as well as to generate conflict. The accession strategy employed by
the EU necessarily shapes strong paths for the candidate countries' politics. It conveys
patterns of identity ('liberal democracy', 'market economy', 'Western community'),
well-defined role models and detailed catalogues of normative facts (in the first place
the Acquis Communautaire, that is mainly the directory of the legal regulations and
directives for the common market). Necessarily, acceding to the EU starts as a
fundamentally unbalanced process, confronting the prospective members with
unnegotiable adaptive pressures. However, for the accession strategy to be successful
and for the EU to enlarge not just geographically and expanding its common market
but to politically and socially integrate the new members, it will be decisive that
adaptive pressures (meeting the accession criteria) and expected utilities of a
membership in the Union balance out each other. The problem is therefore to ensure
sufficient institutionalization of "agency" (Elster/Offe/Preuss 1998: 27-34). An
important aspect overlooked by the economy-centered mainstream of research on EUenlargement (such as Baldone/Sdogati 1997) is how the candidate countries cope with
discrepancies and conflicts between their self-images, their ideas of 'Europe' and their
interest in the EU on the one hand and the EU's collective interests and official idea of
Europe on the other.
Between 1993 and 1997, the EU followed a promising pre-accession strategy suited to
cope with problems of this kind. It was called the "Structured Dialogue", which was a
multilateral mechanism between the EU and the associated countries that was
intended to secure a relatively conflict-free course of the enlargement process
(Lippert/Becker 1998). However, in 1998 the Structured Dialogue was silently buried
when the European Commission came out with its Agenda 2000, confining the
Union's strategy of enlargement to problems of ensuring efficient market economy.
Economy has naturally been the backbone of European integration, but it is neither
enough for solving or preventing conflicts in the course of the accession of new
members nor for achieving the political union the EU intends to become.
The Structured Dialogue was an instructive example of reflective institutionalization
as a practical strategy. It was a multilateral framework for discussion, for
acquaintance with EU standard operating procedures and for preemptive conflict
management in EU-CEE relations. It also had considerable potential for bringing

conflicting positions on current issues in the broader field of foreign policy and
international relations into line. There were meetings on the level of the foreign
ministers on a regular basis, informing the candidate countries about decisions within
CFSP and serving as a platform for developing common positions to hold in the
OSCE or the UN, including the politics towards former Yugoslavia and strategies to
prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Mayhew 1998: 48).
A sincere problem with the Structured Dialogue, which is typical of reflective
institutionalization as a strategy of conflict management, was that its specific
functions and mechanisms soon became obscured in an evolving process of
generalized interaction and emerging generalized expectations. In the course of this,
dividing lines were blurred, making it difficult to determine who is in the club and
who is out. Both sides soon came to practice the Structured Dialogue as a unilateral
enterprise, leaving little space for norms of reciprocity to grow (Lippert/Becker 1998):
The Central and Eastern European Countries used it as an opportunity to fight out a
'beauty contest' and to attempt to assign themselves the status of 'almost members',
linking themselves to internal policy processes of the Union. The EU, on the other
hand, has never intended to offer procedures for circumventing the institutional and
legal boundaries of its club and made no attempts to develop flexible options for
integrating the candidate countries into its procedures on a level lower than the
threshold of membership.
Coming back to the conceptual foundations, the following figure illustrates rationalist
and reflective institutionalization as a strategy of conflict management and their
respective causal logic (adapted from Siedschlag, forthcoming).

From the practitioner's perspective, the point is: When does which of the two models
apply best? Research on early warning and conflict prevention (Kriesberg 1998b;
Lund 1996) suggests the following scheme:

Rationalist institutionalization best applies to preventing well-known conflict
potentials from triggering manifest conflict processes as well as to initiate a deescalation of manifest conflict processes by providing arenas for reciprocation (tit for
tat) and for the emergence of common conflict procedures on the grounds of which
expectations and incentives for self-commitment can grow. For rationalist
institutionalization to exert its full effect, the conflict in question should have the
following characteristics: It should be a conflict over well-defined issues, not over
diffuse concerns or over values; there should be responsive problem treatment (i.e.,
the actors should argue about the specific underlying issues and act specifically
according to the related cleavages); and the competing actors should hold common
perceptions about what their conflict is and how far it reaches.
Reflective institutionalization best applies to defusing conflict potentials and creating
a benign environment for deliberative bargaining between the opponents. It also is
appropriate when conflict regulation schemes have been imported from outside and
now are to be rooted in their new setting, enclosing manifest conflict processes
already going on. For reflective institutionalization to exert its full effect, the conflict
in question should have the following characteristics: There should be common
repertoires of action shared by all opponents, the conflict should be located in a stable
arena, and the conflict-regulating mechanisms should have good institutional fit with
the governing values and procedures in the field; moreover, all controversies
notwithstanding, there should be an overarching latent value commitment.
Apart from these differences, rationalist and reflective institutionalization face some
common problems. Institutionalization as a model for ameliorative conflict
transformation can only function so long as the conflict basically remains the same,
there is a consensus between the adversaries what core issues they are struggling over
and the actors do not change significantly. Especially when new issues emerge or the
common institutional frame of conflict enactment is expanded to include new types of
conflict, it is probable that institutionalization will bring about a pejorative
transformation of conflict.
Perrow (1986: 168) has identified two typical processes of such a pejorative conflict
transformation. First, attempts to transfer a functioning arrangement of conflict
regulation to new problems risks to produce over-externalization: Instrumental
problem-solutions give way to opportunism, that is, the actors aimlessly orient
themselves to general scales of values they deem valid for the moment. Second,
attempting to create new regulating mechanisms within a common institutional setting
risks resulting in over-organization: Control becomes too strong and the institutional
arrangement decays into a shortsighted cartel of its actors' self-interests.
Institutionalization then also becomes over-functionalized, for the actors do not use its

resources broadly but highly selectively and rigidly, wherever adhering to institutional
norms and procedures promises comparative advantage.
In the following chapter, the theoretical concepts referred to here and the cited
preconditions for successful conflict management based on political
institutionalization will be illustrated and amended where necessary by looking at
some practical cases.

4. European cases of political institutionalization and conflict transformation
a) Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE): The invisible hand
of an all-European institution
The OSCE is a classic example of an international institution in the strict sense of the
word: It does not rest on a treaty according to international law, but all its 'textual'
foundations are mere declarations of common principles and intended operating
procedures. However, the OSCE avails of an organizational structure, including the
Permanent Council, the Chairman on Office, an own bureaucracy and long-term field
missions. This has much potential for shaping paths of ameliorative conflict
transformation, and indeed there are several success stories, reaching from solving
conflict between the NATO countries and Russia about conventional arms reduction
to settling secessionist and ethnic dispute in the countries of the former Soviet Union
and also on the Balkans. In late 1998, for example, the OSCE started its Kosovo
Verification Mission, which however was interrupted on the eve of the NATO air
raids.
Established in 1974-75 in order to manage the Cold War in Europe, the Conference
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) - renamed the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe or OSCE in 1994 - adapted more rapidly and
fundamentally to the new security challenges and needs to manage conflict in Europe
than did other institutions (on the OSCE's role in the new Europe, see
Bothe/Ronzitti/Rosas 1997; Hopmann 1999; on OSCE institutions, mechanisms and
missions, see http://www.osceprag.cz). It comprises virtually all states of Europe,
including Russia, plus the U.S. and Canada. In the 1990ies, NATO, the EU and the
Council of Europe were preoccupied with adapting their organizational framework
and standard operating procedures to the new political setting, long being too
consumed with various internal conflicts between national ideas and interests to take
up the task of stability projection and rule-making for conflict prevention, early
warning and early action. The CSCE/OSCE, in contrast, only began to supplant itself
with an organizational framework after post-Cold War Europe had already

experienced some bitter foretaste of crisis and violence, mainly in the field of
nationalist secession, ethnic minorities and transition to democracy.
Whereas the OSCE has been reprimanded for its consensual rule of decision-making
as well as its general focus in service of the idea of greater Europe and all-European
conflict management, it must be said that especially this generality has proven to be
its particular strength. Quite different from NATO, for example, the OSCE did not
need to wrap itself up for years in internal frictions as to how translate asset-specific
investments and strategies into more general action capital allowing to conduct a
policy of stability projection and enlargement. In contrast, OSCE's participating states
elaborated normative standards and common procedures for conflict prevention and
early warning in response to particular crises.
Nevertheless, the OSCE's practical engagement in processes of conflict management
and conflict prevention has only grown slowly and is now as before confined by its
consensual rule and political tradition. According to its charter and tradition, the
OSCE as an institution to provide for security and cooperation on an all-regional scale
is confined in its activities to potentially 'big' conflicts, or at least it has to define a
case in point as such a potentially big conflict. To allow for OSCE activity, a conflict
must have an obvious and unanimously acknowledged security impact above the local
level and bear potential to threaten the new balance of power in Europe on a broad
scale.
In addition to this problem, divergent views of what should be the leading idea of
conflict prevention and conflict management inhibit the OSCE's institutional efficacy
and can produce political conflict between its participating states. The U.S. under the
Clinton presidency preferred to limit OSCE activities to monitoring human rights
violations, spreading norms of democracy and providing a non-coercive framework
for peaceful settlement of conflicts in the area of the former Soviet Union. Britain has
always emphasized the OSCE to be more an international forum for exchanging views
than an international organization entitled to take collective action. Its has constantly
objected any plans to give the OSCE a stronger underpinning in the field of
peacekeeping, let alone peace enforcement, fearing this would undermine NATO and
the transatlantic link. The British idea of all-European conflict management under the
aegis of the OSCE is to agree on a kind of Magna Charter for peaceful settlement of
conflict, resting on declaring common principles rather than elaborating specific
political strategies and mechanisms. France, in contrast, has long had a sincere interest
in strengthening OSCE norms and procedures. This interest however is limited to
disarmament and arms control.
The Central European countries in their strife for NATO membership wanted to see
the OSCE limited to a lose system of communication about values and problems of

common interest, avoiding any institutional duplication in the field of European
security that might open a discussion about possible alternatives to an expansion of
NATO. Though, as soon as NATO membership became a realistic expectation, the
Central European countries, especially Poland, developed a sincere interest in the
OSCE as an arena for discussing conflicting concepts of regional stabilization, for
developing mechanisms of conflict prevention and peaceful settlement of conflict in
the Community of Independent States and for containing U.S.-Russian conflict over
NATO enlargement.
Russia itself has long insisted on developing the OSCE into a string institution with
efficient potential for peace enforcement, not just political mechanisms for
consultation and dialogue in the case of crises (on the foundations of Russia's relations
to European security institutions, see Arbatov/Kaiser/Legvold 1999; Baranovski 1995;
Mandelbaum 1998). It also valued the OSCE as providing voice opportunities for
claiming the status of a large power equal to the U.S. and articulating its national
interests on an all-regional scale. However, in the last four years, disappointment with
OSCE and its alleged domination by the U.S. and the NATO countries have had
Russia scale down much of its engagement for an all-European institution of security
and conflict prevention, now seemingly giving preference to bilateral frameworks on
the basis of NATO's strategic outreach program, such as the NATO-Russia Founding
Act and the Permanent Joint Council.
Nevertheless, Russia has repeatedly declared officially its appreciation and support of
most of the OSCE activities in the area of the former Soviet Union. The OSCE is and
remains the only European security institution in which the Russian Federation is a
partner with equal rights and in the functioning of which Russia has always had a
strong practical interest. Consequently, Russia's initial principal reservations against
any involvement of Western states in conflict management in the countries of the
former Soviet Union have ceased. Moreover, not only has Russia not objected to
OSCE activities in this region but it also has made many active contributions that
were decisive for the success of OSCE missions.
An example is Russia's positive role as co-chairman of the Minsk group, which
promoted the coordination of international efforts to regulate the conflict in NagornoKarabakh, an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan. Moreover, Russia started several
initiatives to strengthen the OSCE's framework for conflict prevention and
peacemaking. Out of its concern for the 25 million Russians living abroad, Russia also
seeks to strengthen the OSCE's role in the field of minority protection and human
rights, as well as - in particular with a view to the situation in Ukraine - to develop
regulations to guarantee independent media. Other Russian proposals for
strengthening the role of the OSCE include codified rules for the establishment and

termination of long-term missions and allocation of resources so to enable OSCE to
conduct small-scale military operations of peace enforcement.
These positive developments notwithstanding, it must also be acknowledged that the
OSCE's institutional character involves problems with applying its high normative
standards to conflict cases in point. As any genuinely institutional arrangement, the
OSCE suffers form the discrepancy between the existence of norms and the factual
relevance of those norms. This factual relevance of norms largely depends on an
active enactment of the norms by the actors themselves, and this enactment often
enough has suffered from predominant calculations in terms of the national selfinterest as well as from conflict about the leading principles of OSCE activity and the
very character of the OSCE itself, as outlined above.
This is especially true for the various crisis mechanisms the OSCE participating states
have agreed upon. There is, for example, a mechanism for diplomatic consultations
which has never been activated, a mechanism for observation and fact-finding in case
of unusual military activities, which has been used in the case of former Yugoslavia
but did not exert strong effects, as well as a mechanism for peaceful settlement of
conflict (the so-called Valetta mechanism agreed on in 1991). The practical
irrelevance of the Valetta mechanism is a telling example of how conflict
management even in an area marked by such a high degree of international
institutionalization and integration as Europe strongly depends on converging national
interests. Fearing a too strong and too broad shadow of the future, the European
countries have always abstained from strongly committing themselves to common
mechanisms of crisis management. They have also been anxious not to undermine the
principle of consensus (or at best consensus minus one) that governs decision-making
within the OSCE, let alone establish compulsive mechanisms for conflict regulation.
These shortcomings notwithstanding, it is the OSCE that has defined clear rules for
confronting minority conflicts in Europe, overcoming the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of a country. Minority conflicts and violations of
human rights have come to be regarded as a legitimate field of OSCE activity all
across its participating states, as well as a politically acknowledged source of
international and regional instability and conflict. On this basis, the OSCE's Office of
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, especially the High Commissioner on
National Minorities, has successfully taken up a decisive role in early warning and
conflict prevention on the grassroots level. The High Commissioner's activity and the
long-term fact-finding missions in Estonia and Latvia for example have made decisive
contributions to preventing escalation of the conflict between the state and the
Russian-speaking minority, thus contributing to defusing regionally destabilizing
tensions between the Baltic states and the Russian Federation (Amor/Estébanez 1997;
van der Stoel 1999). In addition, the OSCE has a successful record of election

monitoring missions and observation missions, conducted by mainly Russian
peacekeeping forces, in the Community of Independent States.
One of the OSCE's efficient secrets in these areas of engagement is the creation of
publicity. The OSCE counts on a strategy of reflective institutionalization, making
conflict behavior visible on a large scale: Publishing its missions' reports and lifting
its endeavors to manage and prevent local conflicts to an all-regional level is expected
to create incentives for accommodation and enactment of norms and rules. Especially,
the OSCE has much political potential for preemptive conflict management. Although
NATO and the EU have been fast to claim and take up a genuine role in stability
projection and all-European conflict management, they will remain closed shops with
difficulty to build a common identity and ensure effective conflict regulation between
its member states. The OSCE, quite differently, has always entailed a process of
identity formation on an all-European scale, save from the danger of over-regulation
and activism.
On this basis, the OSCE has developed special capabilities in the field of good offices,
mediation and post-conflict peace-building in the countries of the former Soviet
Union, with much positive involvement of the Russian Federation. For example,
OSCE missions served as mediators between the government of Moldova and the
secessionist region of Transdniestria and between the government of Georgia and the
separatist regime in South Ossetia. In Tajikistan, the OSCE mission mediated between
the government and rival clans, and in the Baltic states, the OSCE oversees the
implementation of bilateral agreements, such a as the Russian-Latvian accord on the
use of the radar station at Skrunda and agreements between Russia and both Latvia
and Estonia to establish a joint commission on military pensioners.
The OSCE's strength is not to stop wars but to create peace. Further specializing in
constructive forms of conflict prevention and peace consolidation, the OSCE can fill a
gap in the institutional structure of the new Europe. To further develop and strengthen
the OSCE's institutional potential for conflict prevention and conflict management in
the former Soviet Union, it will be important to continue and increase cooperation
with Russia. This is especially necessary in cases where reflective institutionalization
as a strategy of conflict management is decisive. For in most of the conflicts and
potentials for conflict in the area of the former Soviet Union questions of ethnic
identity, national identity and social and political property rights are central, reflective
institutionalization plays a key role in many cases.
This is what makes Russian involvement important here. The Soviet Union was a
powerful participating state in the CSCE, OSCE's predecessor, and Russia inherited
the Soviet Union's various networks of political, social, cultural and economic
relations. At the same time, albeit some vigorous assertions of national sovereignty

and independence, most of the former Soviet Union's republics have a strong interest
in continued cooperation with Russia. For them, Russia is now as before an
indispensable export market and the main creditor. The institutionalized relations
between Russia and the other former Soviet republics are generally deeper than the
Western countries appreciate. These institutionalized relations give Russia a certain
amount of influence in the internal affairs of the countries of the former Soviet Union.
Russia has sometimes been accused of using this leverage as a basis for imperial
politics. However, this leverage provides some indispensable paths to develop a dense
institutional framework of consultation and conflict prevention in Eastern Europe.
b) The Visegrád process: Paths to subregional integration
The Visegrád process (see Cottey 1995; Fitzmaurice 1995; Latwaski 1994) is an
example of an important dimension of the institutionalization of a cooperative order
for Europe. Especially in the process of enlargement of the European Union (EU),
sub-regional cooperation will be an important building block, and it already is a
connecting mechanism, or intermediary institution, between the EU and the associated
countries aspiring for membership. However, as it has become clear over the past few
years, sub-regional cooperation can also bring competition and conflict among those
countries and between them and the EU. Thus, it is an important question in which
areas and under which conditions sub-regional cooperation is conducive to or in the
way of a comprehensive European institutional order.
The Visegrád group was established between Poland, then-Czechoslovakia and
Hungary in February 1991 as a front against the Warsaw Treaty Organization and as a
demonstration enterprise in order to present oneself as part of the West and apt
candidates for NATO membership and membership in the European Community, now
the European Union. Whereas the Visegrád initiative soon led to stable economic
cooperation among its participating states (in December 1992, the Central European
Free Trade Area, or CEFTA, was founded), it has never reached high political density.
On the one hand, stable coordination has developed on the administrative level. There
is an unspectacular but pragmatic coordination process for example between the
ambassadors and also between the ministries of foreign affairs and of defense (see
Pastusiak 1996). On the other hand, this pragmatic coordination has produced some
conflict about the political principles and long-term political aims of the Visegrád
process.
The Visegrád process only created strong commitments for its participating countries
as long as it exerted clear-cut, immediate functions that served all the participating
countries' self-interests and as long as it was largely a self-organized process, with no
external actors involved. It fainted as soon as its functions became externalized and

external actors, namely the EU and NATO with their respective leading nations,
became involved - that is, as soon as the participating states came to interpret and
utilize their cooperative framework not to settle conflict and promote cooperation with
one another but in fact to stand out from one another, each state presenting itself as
the model candidate for NATO and the EU. In addition, the more the EU and NATO
were officially referring to the Visegrád group as a collective actor, the more the
group became, and was seen by its members as, a mere accession club, neither
providing general interaction capital nor fostering a common idea of re-integration
into Europe (Cottey 1995: 134-144). As a consequence, each state of the group was
now giving preference to unilateral strategies, strenuously working against any
appearance of "institutionalized cooperation", because each of them feared that
Western Europe's perception of the Visegrád group as a collective actor would
undermine one's individual progress and run counter to one's endeavors to become a
member of NATO and the EU in the near future.
In addition there was, especially in Poland, a certain fear that an institutionalized
'Westernization' may undermine one's own idea of Europe and political claim to be
treated by the EU as a genuinely European country. This fear bears potential for
manifest political conflict in the relations between Poland and the EU. The Polish
government has always been anxious to reduce the asymmetry in its relations to the
EU as far as possible, underlining that it does not come as a supplicant but has much
cultural and social values to offer for an enlarging EU. This attitude of the Polish
government has strongly been influenced by considerable problems to gain and
maintain broad domestic support for its policy of full integration into the institutions
of Western Europe. Especially the National Catholic Party argued that an accession to
the EU and an implementation of the various EU regulations would cause Poland just
another institutionalized loss of identity. Symptomatic of the political relevance of
such concerns is the painting that the Polish government has ordered for its mission at
the EU in Brussels. It is entitled: "The heathen Europe abducts Poland".
As a consequence of all these factors, the Visegrád cooperation process started to
degenerate and in fact produce conflict because its specific functions became blurred,
leading the participating states to regard their self-commitment not as institutional
capital but as an institutionalized encumbrance (Latawski 1994: 23). This is an
example of the shadow of the future becoming too strong.
However, after all, the EU's and NATO's practice to address the Visegrád group as a
collective actor kept it together and maintained a certain degree of subregional
cooperation in East-Central Europe. With their respective accession strategies and
lists of accession criteria, the EU and NATO set strong incentives to settle disputes
within the group and with neighboring states, including ethnic minority conflict.
Moreover, in October 1998 the Visegrád countries decided to reactivate their political

cooperation on a broad scale and to take steps to institutionalize it. After Poland's, the
Czech Republic's and Hungary's accession to NATO in April 1999, a new aim of the
Visegrád process was now to work together towards effective integration into the
Atlantic Alliance and to take common efforts to become members also of the EU as
soon as possible. Moreover, high-level political coordination was established, with
summits of the Prime Ministers to take place twice a year, on a regular basis.
Additionally, the field of cooperation was broadened, especially with a view to
coordinating one's efforts to comply with the 'soft' sectors of EU-enlargement, that is
for example the area of common cultural policy and the improvement of the standards
of telecommunication.
There is one important lesson to derive from the Visegrád process and its
development: Initial cooperation does not grow evolutionary. Institutionalization
neither necessarily fosters common values, nor does it reduce the relevance of
national interests. In contrast: National interest and strategies provide the paths and
limits along which institutionalized cooperation either stabilizes itself or creepingly
disintegrates. Institutionalization produces conflict whenever its functions become
blurred and the political convertibility of the related institutional capital decreases.
Therefore, institutionalization as a strategy of conflict management must make it clear
from the very beginning which conflicts are to be addressed on the basis of which
procedures and which actors belong to the 'game'.
c) Ethnopolitics in the Baltic states: Path-dependencies, nationalist revival and
accommodation
Ethnic conflict in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), mainly in Latvia and to
a somewhat lesser extent in Estonia, is a multi-faceted conflict (Dreifelds 1996;
Grigorievs 1996; Karklins 1994; Tishkov 1997). Its roots lie in the question of how
the considerable Russian-speaking minority, for the most part a legacy from the times
when the countries were republics of the Soviet Union, should be treated. Current
ethnopolitics in the Baltic states still show a clear path-dependency on Soviet
settlement and language politics. This becomes especially clear in the case of Latvia,
where the Latvians were on the verge of becoming a minority in their own country.
Whereas in 1935, 77 % of the population were native Latvians, that share had
decreased to 52 % of a total population of 2.4 million in 1989 (Karklins 1994: 123),
only insignificantly increasing again to 55.3 % in 1997 (Bungs 1998: 72). The
cleavage between the Russian-speaking population and the Latvians is reinforced by a
sharp contrast between city and country. More than one third of the Latvian
population is concentrated in Riga, the capital, where (as of 1996) only 37.7 % of the
population are of Latvian nationality (Dreifelds 1996: 246-249). Quite different from

Estonia and Lithuania, there is no other conurbation in Latvia and thus no sociocultural and political counterweight to the special minority situation in the capital city.
In addition, the ethnic cleavages in Latvia are ethno-social cleavages: The Russianspeaking population generally has a higher level of education than the Latvian, and
the employment structure reflects ethnic dividing lines as clearly. In industry and
transport, non-Latvian employees are over-represented. This brings much potential for
social conflict because the introduction of market economy and needs for
modernization have had especially severe consequences here, and many employees
lost their jobs as a consequence of rationalization measures (Dreifelds 1996: 159-161).
Moreover, ethnopolitics in the Baltic states are strongly influenced by the conflictgenerating nature of post-socialist politics in general, as identified by Schöpflin
(1996): Because political trust is missing, political opponents prematurely frame their
relationship as antagonistic and come to see their strife for political prevalence as a
question of survival and indispensable self-defense.
In addition to the particular structure of conflict, ethnopolitics in the Baltic states is an
especially interesting case for it runs counter to the current conceptual assumptions
about path-dependencies and institutionalized cleavages in ethnic minority conflicts.
According to De Nevers' (1993) model of how democratization and ethnic conflict
interact, we should have expected severe and violent ethnic conflict in Estonia and
Latvia because almost all of the criteria for ethnic conflict escalation in the course of
democratic transition are met: historically rooted grievances and stereotypes,
ethnopolitical heritage from the times of the authoritarian rule, systematic differences
in the ethnic groups' political chances, and the identification of the previous,
authoritarian regime with the ethnic minority. Thus, the conflict setting is deeply
socio-politically institutionalized, and it comprises both a shadow of the past and a
shadow of the future. The conflict between the members of the titular nationality and
the Russian-speaking population goes back to factors which are conspicuous but
cannot be altered retrospectively. At the same time, these factors shape paths for the
future development of the conflict, which however can be just as little influenced
purposefully because the expectations and interpretations that belong to them are
inherited.
This socio-political institutionalization of conflict does not mean that
institutionalization strategies are out of the question for conflict management. In
contrast, a specific strategy of institutionalization has proven to be especially
promising here. It is a strategy of paradoxical institutionalization: lowering the
barriers for the Russian-speaking population to articulate their concerns, display their
identity, guarantee the reproduction of their identity and language and creating paths
for a regularized entry of the language and citizenship conflict into the arenas and
procedures of the new democratic system. Recent surveys have shown that a clear

majority of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia does precisely not
think and act in Gurr's (1994) terms of "peoples against states". In contrast, it is
prepared to accept democracy's institutional paths of articulation and aggregation of
interests and needs and does not strive to undermine the government and appeal to the
Russian Federation for external support. Consequently, the Russian-speaking minority
demands an increase in property rights so to make better use of the institutional
resources of democratic statecraft. For example, already in the end of 1992, 87 % of
the minority population in Estonia and 97 % of the minority population in Latvia
stated that they would go to the ballot if there were elections next Sunday and they
had the right to vote (Klingemann/Lass/Mattusch 1994: 178).
During the first few years of independence however, Latvia and Estonia followed a
very restrictive minority policy, setting the barriers - especially the language
requirements - for citizenship application very high. In those years, it was difficult
even for newly born children to become naturalized. In the last few years however, the
institutional shadow of Western European integration has brought about a clear trend
of accommodation in the minority policies of the Estonian and Latvian government.
The Council of Europe, NATO and the EU - they all made it clear that settling of
minority issues and compliance with West European minority rights legislation
standards was an indispensable precondition for membership.
Nevertheless, looking for strategies of ameliorative conflict transformation in Latvia
and Estonia, many analysts have argued not for institutional outreach of this kind but
for nation building and promotion of an inclusive civil society. Because ethnopolitical
conflict in the Baltic states is not confined to specific issues, political
institutionalization of ethnicity - that is, for example, introducing Lijphart's (1977)
consocialism and politically addressing Latvia and Estonia as multiethnic societies - at
first sight indeed seems to be a promising strategy of conflict transformation. Yet it is
precisely the framing of common political and social conflict as "ethnopolitical" and
"ethnonational" that has repeatedly sparked manifest minority conflict, also in cases of
public conflicts only all too normal for a modern democracy and in which no ethnic
and minority issues were at stake. Judging from this experience, it has to be expected
that any further political institutionalization of ethnicity will result in common
political and social conflict being framed as ethnically motivated and thus not defuse
but exacerbate ethnopolitical cleavages, contribute to their reproduction and create
additional occasions for manifest conflict processes.
Another strong argument for the view that political institutionalization of ethnicity
shapes paths for a pejorative transformation of conflict is the experience that a strong
source of nationalism in contemporary Europe and the Western world in general is the
idea that ethnicity has become a substitute for individual and collective identity,
making up for the loss of traditional embeddedness of the individual into society (see

Kupchan 1995). We know today that under those conditions, already the perception
that there is some minority policy conducted by the government can trigger a survival
of ethnic consciousness. The same is true for any attempts to translate ethnic identity
into generalized civic identity, an experience that has for example been made in
Quebec.
Our current state of knowledge suggests that it is a better strategy not to
institutionalize political ethnicity (for example through extended minority rights and
cultural autonomy) but to foster a democratic society in which ethnicity is but one of
many, competing sources of individual, civic and political identity (Kupchan 1995:
184). Corresponding to this concept, Estonia and Latvia as well as Lithuania have
taken encouraging steps to archive an ameliorative transformation of ethnic minority
conflict: The question of minority rights is now being framed in technical terms of a
general problem of human rights, de-emotionalizing it and separating it from the
broad filed of history-laden, protracted conflict in Baltic-Russian relations. By 199495, effective steps had been taken to institutionalize the protection of human rights,
either through an ombudsman (as in Estonia and Lithuania) or through a national
office of human rights (as in Latvia) (Bungs 1998: 52).
Creating opportunities for expressing identity and belonging on the basis of
internationally agreed standards of human rights rather than minority rights or
ethnicity broke two tracks of conflict escalation. First, it allowed the governments to
take steps of inter-ethnic accommodation and to be responsive to the claims made by
the Russian-speaking minority without undermining their newly acquired sovereignty
and idea of nationality. Second, it discouraged Russia from its exaggerated policy of
protection of its external minorities and from utilizing this argument for claiming
economic and strategic predominance in the Baltic region. This also is an interesting
revalidation of the classical argument made by Kornhauser (1959): Intermediary,
mere technical than value-laden institutions prevent both the articulation of minority
claims through collective political violence and the political instrumentalization of
minority conflicts by elites.

5. Conclusion: Design and agency
To sum up, several criteria must be met for institutionalization as a strategy of conflict
management to be successful, that is, to bring about an ameliorative conflict
transformation:
1. Institutionalization as a strategy of conflict management to a considerable
extent depends on existing organizational structures, mechanisms of problem

definition and typified actors, for instance reference groups providing positive
role models (cf. the PET-principle outlined in ch. 2, p. 6).

In this respect, the question of reflective vs. rationalist institutionalism (or
agent vs. structure) is no question of either or. For example, rationalist
strategies, such as institutional design, must be supplanted by reflective
strategies, such as fostering common ideas and value commitments. Even the
strongest structures for conflict regulation only become effective when the
actors actually act within them.
2. Historically evolved, somewhat chronified, recurrent conflicts are in the most
cases not detrimental but conducive to institutionalization as a strategy of
conflict management. They contribute to strong typifications and reciprocity,
which seems to be more a precondition for ameliorative conflict transformation
than for escalation.

3. Theoretical and empirical analysis shows that whether institutional design and
transfer of values and norms result in an ameliorative transformation of conflict
depends not so much on establishing problem-solving mechanisms and arenas
for bargaining but on taking into account path-dependencies particular to the
conflict process in question.

4. In addition, it is essential that institutionalization does not block the conflict
process but opens new opportunities to continue it within a regularized
framework. Therefore, institutional design alone is not enough. Very important
is a proper institutional fit: Conflict-regulating mechanisms must be compatible
with the social reality to which they are applied.

5. Formal arrangements, however value-laden they may be, affect nothing. Much
depends on the actors and their "agency", or instrumental behavior
(Elster/Offe/Preuss 1998: 27-34). They must actively take up the arrangements,
their principles, procedures and rules and "enact" them in concrete cases of
conflict (Olsen 1991; Scott 1995).

A lack of agency causes a gap between making and application of norms and
rules. This problem is obvious in the new Europe. Many institutions - the
European Union, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and others - have acted as
producers of European political, legal and moral standards, but when it comes
to allocating property rights for the enactment of those standards and to
developing and agreeing on specific procedures, their record is by far not as
impressive.
6. In institutionalized conflict regulation, less usually is more (cf. Fearon 1998): A
too broad shadow of the future may shape paths for a decay of cooperation and
a pejorative transformation of conflict.

When a cooperative arrangement becomes too dense, dysfunctional
expectations and norms of disruptive reciprocity emerge, leading to
dysfunctional agency. Actors tend to project their single 'moves' onto a too
broad horizon of time. The result is uncertainty whether cooperative strategies
chosen now will also prove effective and compatible with one's self-interest in
the future, and this again results in a considerably reduced willingness of the
actors to commit themselves to institutional rules.
7. Finally, it is important to remember that institutionalization does not mean just
to increase the density of the network of relations between actors or to change
the relative 'positions' of the actors in the conflict system. Rather, it aims at
an ameliorative transformation of whole conflict processes, including their
cognitive context, and extends over the whole setting of conflict relations
belonging to the respective case in point.

Specifically speaking, institutionalization is a strategy of alternative dispute
resolution, seeking win-win outcomes, but it is not the clue to a general remedy for
conflict: Institutionalization does not so much seek to skillfully settle or even solve
conflict as it does to transform coercive, disintegrative and destructive conflict
processes into accommodative, inclusive and creative ones (Kriesberg 1998a;
Lederach 1997). Institutionalization hence is a promising strategy of conflict
management within the politicalprocess itself, as opposed to conflict management
procedures that operate in contexts which are more or less separated from the
immediate socio-political conflict setting, such as mediation, workshops, elite round
tables or mere technical institutional design focusing on the formal allocation of
property rights but lacking empowerment strategies so to enable the actors to actively
take up these property rights.
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